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NEW YORK STATE WARRANTIES ON
SALES OF NEW HOMES ACT: FROM
CAVEAT EMPTOR TO STATUTORY
WARRANTY PROTECTION
Recently, the New York State Legislature enacted the Warran-
ties on Sales of New Homes Act (the Act).' Aimed at enhancing
the rights of the new home buyer,2 the law provides for implied
warranties of workmanlike construction and habitability which
survive conveyance of title.' This Note will examine significant
case law which led to the proposal of the statute, discuss its legisla-
tive history, and provide a critical analysis of the Act's capacity to
achieve the legislative objective.
Despite a variety of protections afforded consumers in most
sales transactions," consumer safeguards in the area of real estate
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777 (McKinney Supp. 1989). The Act was signed into law Sept. 6,
1988 and took effect March 1, 1989. Ch. 709, § 1 119881 N.Y. LAws 2211.
2 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777 (5). "New Home" is defined as "any single family house or
for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less in which title to the
individual units is transferred to owners under a condominium or cooperative regime." Id.
"Such terms do not include dwellings constructed solely for lease, mobile homes ... or any
house or unit in which the builder has resided or leased continuously for three years or
more following the date of completion of construction, as evidenced by a certificate of
occupancy." Id.
3 Id. § 777-a (1). The Act states that "notwithstanding section 251 of the Real Property
Law, a Housing Merchant Implied Warranty is implied in the contract or agreement for
the sale of a new home and shall survive the passage of title." Id. Section 251 of the Real
Property Law provides that "a covenant is not implied in a conveyance of real property,.
N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 251 (McKinney 1989).
See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 - 15, 2-318 (1977). Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
applicable only to contracts for the sale of goods, extends statutory warranty protections
that include implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Id.
See also Hennsingsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 76 (1960)
("Iilf the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular pur-
pose for which the Article is required and it appears that he has relied on the seller's skill
or judgment, an implied warranty arises of reasonable fitness for that purpose"); MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389-91, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (allowing
recovery for personal injury arising out of use of any product which has been negligently
manufactured irrespective of lack of privity); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396, 410-11
(1852) (manufacturer has duty to prevent negligent mislabeling of inherently dangerous
product). See generally Lawrence & Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due-Course
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sales have not been coextensive.5 The return of servicemen after
World War II and their desire to become homeowners led to the
mass production of homes across the United States.6 This phe-
nomenon, in turn, gave rise to claims of shoddy workmanship and
hidden defects necessitating judicial intervention and an examina-
tion of the doctrine of caveat emptor.7
New York courts, realizing that caveat emptor was harsh and
obsolete, gradually began to recognize exceptions to this doctrine
by applying theories of negligence' and the contract principles of
Doctrine on the Commercialization of Innovative Consumer Products, 64 B.U.L. REV. 325, 330-31
(1984) ("erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor . . . and extension of product warranty
liability" was result of consumer demands that commercial entrepreneurs' assume greater
responsibility for costs created by their market activities).
' See, e.g., Perin v. Mardine Realty Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 685, 685, 168 N.Y.S.2d 647, 647(2d Dep't 1957) (no action lies for failure to disclose material defect); Eastman v. Britton,
175 App. Div. 476, 477, 162 N.Y.S. 587, 588 (4th Dept. 1916) (no implied warranty in
building contracts); Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc. 47 Misc. 2d 322, 331-32, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544,
553-54 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965) (doctrine of caveat emptor applies to sale of com-
pleted house whether newly built or previously occupied); see also Gallegos v. Graff, 32
Colo. Ct. App. 213, 214, 508 P.2d 798, 799 (1973) (implied warranty protections of
U.C.C. does not apply to real estate transactions); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp.
476, 481, 266 A.2d 200, 203 (1970) (same). See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty -Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 542 (1961) ("doctrine of caveat
emptor . . . clings tenaciously to the black letter law of sales of realty"); Note, When the
Walls Come Tumbling Down - Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
670, 685 (1988). (Merger doctrine extinguishes all warranties of fitness and quality not
specifically recited in the deed).
6 See K. HOLTZSCHUE, PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY § 40.0 1111 at 40-1 (1987)
(housing industry witnessed swift development subsequent to World War II): Bearman,
supra note 5, at 550-55 (return of United States servicemen in part helped bring about
changes in the protection given purchasers of new homes) Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent
Nondisclosure of a Multiple Murder in a Real Estate Transaction, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 877, 881-
82 (1984) (end of Second World War saw boom in housing industry which in turn led to
increased claims against builder-vendors because of defective construction).
7 See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchase of a Defective Home, 49 J. URB. L.
533, 556 (1971) (since mid-1950's, courts have held builders accountable for quality of
their work): Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37
MINN. L. REV. 108, 110 (1953) (analogizing World War II housing boom with 19th century
mass production of goods); Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications,
New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 291-92 (1980) (mass production of homes after
World War 11 was believed to be factor in decline of quality in new home construction);
Note, supra note 6, at 881-82 (complaints of shoddy workmanship in new home construc-
tion increased after World War 11). See also Note, Protecting the Virginia Homebuyer: A Duty to
Disclose Defects, 73 VA. L. REV. 459, 465 (1987) ("[tlhe trend over the past thirty years has
been away from a strict application of caveat emptor in the sale of real property"). See gener-
ally Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835 (1967) (discussing evolution of decisions safeguarding new home purchasers from
builders vis-a-vis various theories of liability).
e See Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 144, 143 N.E.2d 895, 899, 164
292
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collateral agreement, the merger doctrine and implied warranty.9
While the New York courts unanimously agreed that recovery for
patent or obvious defects was barred once title had passed,10 it was
unclear whether there existed an implied warranty of habitability
or workmanship in the contract of sale. Some courts held that
new home construction contracts were separate and collateral to
the deed, and thus survived transfer of title" while others found
that covenants contained within construction agreements merged
N.Y.S.2d 699, 703 (1957) (in extending negligence doctrine to real property transactions,
court noted that "no logical basis" exists for a distinction between buildings and chattels)
accord Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849, 851-52 (Okla. 1961). See generally Bearman,
supra note 5, at 566-70 (tracing courts' usage of MacPherson doctrine to hold vendors liable
for negligence in constructing defective home).
' See infra notes 11 - 14 and accompanying text.
10 See Whitman v. Lakeside Builders & Developers, Inc., 99 App. Div. 2d 679, 679-80,
472 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52-53 (4th Dep't 1984) (court erred in permitting recovery for patent
defects where defendant had notice at time of transfer); Dolezel v. Fialkoff, 2 App. Div. 2d
642, 642, 151 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735-36 (3d Dep't 1956) (court reversed judgment for pur-
chaser on implied warranty claim because buyer was on notice of obvious defect prior to
sale of house). See also Abney, Determining Damages for Breach of Implied Warranties in Con-
struction Defect Cases, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 210, 211-12 (1988) (discussing judicial consensus
that patent defects which were discoverable upon reasonable inspection by prospective
homeowner will bar subsequent recovery for damages).
" See Davis v. Weg, 104 App. Div. 2d 617, 619, 479 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (2d Dep't 1984)
(collateral contract providing that premises would be delivered free of defects survived de-
livery of deed to vendee); Town of Ogden v. Howarth & Sons, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 213, 217,
294 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1968) (merger clause fails when agree-
ment to construct new home is separate and thereby collateral to conveyance of land);
Cohen v. Polera & Sons Constr. Corp., N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1958, at 14, col. 4. The county
court looked upon the construction of a new home as "collateral" to sale of the land to the
purchaser. Id. at 14, col. 5. Accordingly, the court held that a claim pertaining to the
workmanship and construction of a newly completed home was not foreclosed by the trans-
fer of title. Id. at 14, col. 6. See also Zanphir v. Bonnie Meadows, Inc., 127 N.Y.S.2d 269,
271 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County. 1953) (parties' specific collateral agreement for creation
of escrow account survived closing of title). See generally G. PINDAR, AMERICAN REAL ESTATE
LAW § 19-145 n.5 (1976) (recognition by courts that where delivery of deed represents
only part performance of contractual obligation, other outstanding obligations are not
merged in deed): Dunham, Merger by Deed - Was it Ever Automatic, 10 GA. L. REV. 419, 443
(1976) ("since . . . purpose of conveyance is to convey title, any promises not connected
with the title is not merged in the deed... "); Bearman, supra note 5, at 548 (warranties
not within deed and not involved with conveyance of property are "by their nature collat-
eral to main purpose of deed and so survive"); Note, supra note 5, at 686-87. Independent
or collateral agreements exception has been used most effectively to "distinguish as collat-
eral the contractual agreement to construct the dwelling house from the agreement to
convey the land," thereby permitting "an implied warranty of workman like construction
. . . based upon accepted construction contract precedents." Id; Comment, Merger of Land
Contract in Deed, 25 ALB. L. REV. 122, 122-29 (1961) (discussing dilemma faced by courts in
determining whether parties' actions in one area of agreement merged rest of contract in
deed).
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with the deed and became extinguished pursuant to section 251 of
the Real Property Law."2 The issue was further compounded by
judicial concern over the unequal bargaining positions of the
builder-vendor and purchaser 3 and the relief available to the
buyer under a theory of implied warranty. 4 Thus, the courts had
"' N.Y. REAl. PROP. LAW § 251 (McKinney 1988). The statute states that "a covenant is
not implied in a conveyance of real property, whether the conveyance contains any special
covenant or not." Id. See Carter v. Cain, 112 App. Div. 2d 2, 3, 490 N.Y.S.2d 472, 472
(4th Dept. 1985) (in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, court held Real
Property Law § 251 barred recovery for construction defects under implied warranty the-
ory): Spano v. Perry, 59 Misc. 2d 1062, 1063-64 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1969) (in
foreclosure action, court rejected defendant's counterclaim of breach of implied warranty
of habitability and fitness for completed home as excluded by Real Property Law § 251);
Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 329, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544, 551 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1965) ("it seems clear that there is no implied warranty in the sale of a completed
house . . . "). See generally 3.AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.65 at 165 (1974) (absent
material mistake, acceptance of deed usually merges covenants found in contract of sale
into deed): R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.12 at
696-97 (1984) (courts will determine if there has been a merger of covenants into deed by
considering parties' intent the contract itself and surrounding circumstances).
"S DeRoche v. Dame, 75 App. Div. 2d 384, 387, 430 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (court recog-
nized unequal bargaining dilemma faced by purchasers who of necessity rely on builders'
capabilities to satisfactorily construct home), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 821, 413 N.E.2d
366, 433 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1980); Rowe v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 385
N.E.2d 566, 569, 412 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1978) ("the law has developed the concept of
unconscionability so as to prevent the unjust enforcement of onerous contractual terms
which one party is able to impose under the other because of a significant disparity in
bargaining power"): State of New York v. Wolowitz, 96 App. Div. 2d 47, 67, 468 N.Y.S.2d
131, 145 (2d*Dep't 1983) ("inequality of bargaining power . . . and an imbalance in the
understanding and acumen of the parties" are examples of procedural unconscionability).
The equitable concept of unconscionability is an established doctrine of contract law
which has allowed courts to police agreements against unfair "overreaching by a commer-
cial party or by one in a strong and knowledgeable bargaining position, against a consumer
person in a weaker, more vunerable position." H. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS
12.06111 at 12-68 (1986). This common law concept has been extended by statute to trans-
actions in goods. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). The New York legislature codified the doctrine of
conscionability in the landlord-tenant area with the enactment of § 235-c of the Real Prop-
erty Law. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c (McKinney 1988).
" See, e.g., Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762, 768 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1956). The Lutz court found an implied term in the construction agreement that
the house would be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner in addition to the
express covenants that the work and materials would comply with local requirements juris-
diction and those of the lending institution. Id. at 767-68. The court stated in dictum that
"[ilf the house did not meet such standards [as provided by the implied term] then, in the
absence of other contract provisions barring relief to the purchaser, he would have an ac-
tionable claim for breach of contract." Id. at 768. (emphasis added); Centrella v. Holland
Constr. Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 537, 539, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County
1975) (following trend of New York case law, court maintained that purchase of newly
completed home from builder-vendor implies warranty that all work was performed in
"workmanlike manner"). See Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1447 (1974) (recommends implied warranty of
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essentially made their determinations on a contract-by-contract
basis.
The ambivalence of the state courts toward a uniform recogni-
tion of an implied warranty of habitability and workmanlike con-
struction in new homes was mirrored in the New York State Leg-
islature. In 1967, the New York State Legislature's Law Revision
Commission authorized an exhaustive study of the issue.15 Despite
the Commission's recommendation and support of two Senate
bills designed to amend the real property law by placing liability
on "housing merchants" for personal injuries and breach of war-
ranty,16 the bill was not enacted.17
habitability should be imposed on residential homes); Bixby, supra note 7, at 534 ("devel-
opment of implied warranty of habitability in sales of homes, at the expense of the seller-
oriented maxim caveat emptor, will benefit everyone who purchases a home"): Haskell,
supra note 6, at 633-38 (1965) (examining theory of implied warranty of merchantability in
real property transactions).
Other New York courts have applied the implied warranty provision only in certain cir-
cumstances, most commonly for homes under construction when the breach occurred. See,
e.g., Spano v. Perry, 59 Misc. 2d 1062, 1063, 301 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins
County 1969) (court found no basis in either statutory or decisional law which provided
implied warranty of fitness for purpose upon purchase of completed home); Lido Dunes,
Inc., 47 Misc. 2d at 329, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (dictum) (implied warranties might be availa-
ble to homes under construction). Some commentators believe that there is no valid reason
to distinguish between finished and unfinished homes. See Young, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or
Caveat Venditor? 24 ARK. L. REv. 245, 250-52 (1971) (criticizes early courts' decisions of
granting implied warranties of fitness for habitation and good workmanship only to homes
under construction at time of sale); Bearman, supra note 5, at 545-46. (noting paradox that
purchaser of unfinished home received implied warranty that home would be structurally
sound, while no implied warranties would prevail if that same house was purchased day
after its completion).
" See New York Law Revision Commission Implied Warranty Doctrine as Applied to the
Sale of New Housing, 119671 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 37-74. In 1967, the New York
Law Revision Commission authorized Professor Ernest F. Roberts, Jr. to study the modern
trend in the United States towards consumer protection of new homeowners. Id. When the
study directed its attention to New York, it found that the state courts were ambivalent
towards utilizing implied warranties on homes under construction, much less newly built
homes. Id. at 75. Additionally, most real property actions were brought under a breach of
contract claim and the cases often turned upon the applicability of the merger clause to the
situation. Id.
'0 Id. at 32-35, 47-48. Exhaustive in its research, the Commission's study concluded that
a mass developer of housing was in essence, a "manufacturer" and therefore should fall
within the warranty provisions established under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Id. The study closed with the suggestion that since the legislature has enacted regu-
lations designed to protect consumers from inadequately and poorly made goods, that "the
new commodity market in housing deserves similar attention." Id. at 74. The Law Revision
Commission recommended and supported two proposed Senate bills designed to amend
the real property law by placing liability on "housing merchants" for personal injuries and
breach of warranty. N.Y.S. 4219 and N.Y.S. 4222, 190th Sess. (1967). See Recommenda-
295
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 291, 1989
I. THE CACECI DECISION: A CATALYST FOR CHANGE
Recently, in Caceci v. DiCanio Construction Corp.," the New York
Court of Appeals examined the issue of whether an implied war-
ranty should be imposed on the contract between a vendor and a
purchaser of a new home. Mr. and Mrs. Caceci had contracted
with the defendant construction corporation for the purchase of
land upon which the defendant agreed to build a single family
house.19 In the contract of sale, the defendant expressly guaran-
teed the building's systems for one year but limited this protection
to the repair or replacement of defects arising from poor
workmanship.20
Four years after the closing of title, structural defects began to
surface.21 In an attempt to discover the cause of the problem, the
tion of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to the Liability of Hous-
ing Merchants For Personal Injuries and Breach of Warranty, 119671 N.Y. Law Rev.
Comm'n Rep. 7, 8. It was in these proposed amendments that the term "housing
merchant" was used to denote "any person building one or more dwellings or causing one
or more dwellings to be built for the purpose of the sale thereof." ld. at 3. The Law
Revision Commission's recommendation to the New York Legislature was two-fold. The
Commission first recommended legislation that imposed absolute liability on the housing
merchant whenever substandard construction of a new home caused personal injury or
death. Id. at 7. Second, the Commission further believed that newly completed homes de-
served the same warranty protection, both expressed and implied, normally applicable in
sale of goods transactions found under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
The Commission further advocated that a housing merchant be required to provide a bond
upon the transfer of the deed to the purchaser, in the event that the housing merchant
failed to "satisfy Ihisl liability arising Itherein]." Id. at 8 n.12.
"7 See Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to
the Liability of Housing Merchants For Personal Injuries and Breach of Warranty, 119671
N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. apps. l(A)(l) & (2). Though the New York State legislature
implemented most of the Law Revision Commission's recommendations, the bill never
made it beyond theJudiciary Committee in the Senate and the Mortgage Committee in the
Assembly.
Indeed, it appears that the legislature did not attempt to enact another such home war-
ranty statute for the next twelve years. See N.Y.A. 4399-D, 202th Sess. (1979): N.Y.A.
4448, 205th Sess. (1982); N.Y.A. 3501, 206th Sess. (1983); N.Y.A. 3509, 208th Sess.
(1985).
" Caceci v. DiCanio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 526 N.E.2d 266, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771
(1988).
" Id. at 55, 526 N.E.2d at 266, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
20 Id. The guarantee protected against problems with plumbing, heating, electrical work,
and roof and basement seepage arising from defective workmanship. Id. at 55, 526 N.E.2d
at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72. These provisions also specified that the house would be
built according to the local building codes. Id.
"i Id. at 55-56, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772. In 1981, defendant was notified
of a dip in the kitchen floor and repair was attempted. Id. Defendant's work did not solve
the problem and the next year defendant again attempted to cure. Id. at 56-57, 526 N.E.2d
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Cacecis hired a construction engineering firm who examined the
ground beneath the home's foundation. 2 The examination re-
vealed that the problem was due to a sinking foundation caused
by the home's construction on poor soil. 3 Subsequent work to
correct the problem took seven months.2 4
The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit, and the trial court sus-
tained claims of negligent construction and breach of an implied
warranty of workmanlike construction.2 5 The Appellate Division
affirmed, basing its opinion exclusively on the implied warranty
theory. 26 On appeal, the defendant-builder challenged the courts'
movement away from the laissez-faire doctrine of caveat emptor.7
As an issue of first impression for the New York Court of Ap-
peals, 2 8 the court rejected the judicially instituted precept of ca-
at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772. These repairs failed to solve the problem which worsened
over time. Id. at 55-56, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
22 Caceci, 72 NY2d at 56, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
" Id. The soil was composed of deteriorating tree trunks, wood, and other biodegrad-
able material. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. Following a nonjury trial, but before close of proof, the court dismissed three
causes of action alleging fraud and negligent repair. Id. Of the three remaining causes of
action, the court rejected plaintiff's claim of breach of contract while upholding the other
two. Id. The trial court entered judgment of $57,466 for plaintiffs. Id. The court stated
the judgment represented the reasonable cost of "correcting defendant's slipshod perform-
ance," plus costs and interest from December 1981, the date that the initial problem was
discovered. Id.
,' Caceci v. DiCanio Constr. Corp., 132 App. Div. 2d 591, 592, 517 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754
(2d Dep't 1987). On appeal, the defendant argued that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima
facie case for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike construction because they had
not shown that defendant knowingly built on inadequate soil. Id. After the appellate divi-
sion reviewed the record, it found sufficient evidence had been presented for the trier of
fact to infer that the defendant knowingly constructed the home on infirmed soil. Id.
27 Caceci, 72 N.Y.2d at 57, 526 N.E.2d at 267-68, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772-73 (1988). In
support of its argument, defendant stressed that "far-reaching policy considerations"
would result in the movement away from caveat emptor and that such drastic alterations
were better left for legislative determination. Id. at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 269, 530 N.Y.S.2d at
774.
21 Id. at 58, 526 N.E.2d at 268, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 773. Some fifteen years ago, the Su-
preme Court of the State of Washington decided a case almost identical to the facts of
Caceci. See House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969). In Thornton, cracks
began to appear on the home's exterior walls within three months after purchase. Id. at
430, 457 P.2d at 201. During the next two years cracks began to appear on interior walls;
the chimney separated from the structure: and the floors began to shift and sink. Id. at
430-31, 457 P.2d at 201. Although plaintiffs cause of action was based on deceit and mis-
representation, the court based its holding on neither, stating: " [wje apprehend it to be
the rule that when a vendor-builder sells a new house to its intended occupant, he im-
pliedly warrants that the foundations supporting it are firm and secure and that the house
297
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veat emptor as a residual relic from the nineteenth century indus-
trial revolution era." Judge Bellacosa, writing for the court, noted
that the shift away from caveat emptor which led to the buyers'
protection against latent defects in the sale of goods was equally
applicable to the area of realty, especially in light of the mass pro-
duction of homes after World War 11.3
Affirming the decision below,3 the Caceci court held that there
existed a "Housing Merchant" warranty which imposes by legal
implication a contractual obligation on a builder-vendor to con-
struct a home in a skillful manner free of material defects.3 2 The
court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that they were entitled to
expect a new home to be both habitable and built in a skillful
manner, and the law should respect and enforce those
expectations.3"
The court of appeals holding was heralded as a landmark which
judicially extended implied warranty protection to newly built
homes. 4  Although considered a "lemon law" for new
is safe for the buyer's intended purpose of living in it." Id. at 436, 457 P.2d at 204.
" Caceci v. DiCanio Constr. Corp. 72 N.Y.2d at 57, 526 N.E.2d at 268, 530 N.Y.S.2d at
771. The court's examination of New York case law involving the sale of new homes re-
vealed that for the last thirty years, the lower courts had followed a growing proclivity
towards the recognition of implied warranty of quality and skillful construction by the
builder. Id. at 58, 526 N.E.2d at 268-69, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
30 Id. at 58, 526 N.E.2d 268-69, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 773. The court opined that the need
for such warranty protection was based on the superior bargaining position of the seller,
the potential for latent defects due to faulty workmanship of the builder and the pur-
chaser's inability to inspect the dwelling for hidden defects. Id. at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 269,
530 N.Y.S.2d at 774. "Thus, the purchaser has no meaningful choice but to rely on the
builder-vendor to deliver what was bargained for - a house reasonably fit for the purpose
for which it was intended." Id. Therefore, public policy dictates that liability be "placed on
the party best able to prevent the loss" - the seller. Id.
3, Id. at 56, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Although the Court of Appeals
upheld the Appellate Division's decision, it expressly disagreed with their holding that de-
fendant's knowledge of a defect is a prerequisite to the determination that a cause of action
exists under the implied warranty doctrine. Id.
32 Caceci, 72 N.Y.2d at 55, 526 N.E.2d at 266, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 771. In refuting defend-
ant's claim that implied warranties regarding latent defects merged with the title at closing,
the court held that to allow the act of title closing itself to bar future actions precipitated
by latent, undetectable defects would be "self-contradictory, illusory and against [the cur-
renti public policy." Id. at 56-57, 526 N.E.2d at 267, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
33 Id. at 60-61, 526 N.E.2d at 270, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
" See Browne, Implied Warranty in Home Building Upheld, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1988, at 1, col.
3. The writer indicated the Caceci decision represented a new era in "consumer law" re-
versing the common law doctrine of caveat emptor. Id.
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homebuyers, 6 Caceci still leaves several questions unanswered.
The court failed to explain the term "housing merchant war-
ranty," and to supply a standard as to what constituted skillful
performance. Thus, it appeared inevitable that the lower courts
would have the burden of interpreting these undefined terms on a
case-by-case basis, 6 absent subsequent interpretation by the court
of appeals or legislative intervention codifying these warranty
rights. Fortunately for New York, the latter quickly occurred. 7
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO CAVEAT EMPTOR IN NEW HOUSING
SALES
A. Warranties on Sales of New Homes Act: The New York Response
During the 1987-88 legislative session, a resurgence in the area
of consumer protection in new home sales materialized. 8 As a re-
sult, a bill calling for an amendment to the General Business Law
providing for warranty protection for new home buyers was intro-
35 Let's Have a Lemon Law for Homebuyers, Newsday, July 5, 1988, at 48 (editorial), col. 2.
The commentary favorably compared the court of appeals decision in Caceci to the protec-
tion given car buyers under the "Lemon Law" statute. Id. The author stressed the time is
ripe for the New York State legislature to take appropriate action to statutorily compel
compliance by builders to construct dwellings "free from material defects." Id.
" See Memorandum of the New York State Builders Association, Inc. 119881 (memoran-
dum discussed the necessity for a warranty on new homes statute because of the courts slow
"case by case basis for interpretation"). See, e.g., Vento v. Honeybee Homes, Inc., 141
Misc. 2d 997, 535 N.Y.S.2d 344 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1988). Brought in
Small Claims Court, plaintiff sought damages based upon breach of an implied housing
merchant warranty by defendant. Id. For a period of six years after the purchase of their
home from defendant-builder, plaintiffs alleged that the roof of their home had continu-
ously leaked. Id. Defendant argued that because plaintiffs cause of action was commenced
more than six years after transfer of title, their action was time barred by the contract's
warranty period. Id. Holding that the defendant erred in its judgment that the contract
time limitation' applied, the court looked to Caceci to guide its decision. Id. at 998, 535
N.Y.S.2d at 345. Applying Caceci to the facts before it, the court "assumeld] that the stat-
ute of limitations for the implied housing merchant warranty . . . is for a period equal to
what a reasonable expectation would be that a house constructed in a workmanlike manner
would be free of material defects." Id. Thus the court held that plaintiffs action was not
time barred. Id.
" See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 777, 777-a (McKinney 1989). This new law provides that a
housing merchant implied warranty shall be implied in every contract or agreement for the
sale of a new home. Id. Although the law was approved on Sept. 6, 1988, it was not effec-
tive until six months later, on March 1, 1989. Id. at § 777-b, § 3.
" See infra notes 40-43.
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duced on the floor of the state legislature. 9 Two months later,4
the Warranties on Sales of New Homes Act was signed into law."'
This Act is comprised of three categories. The first defined
such terms as "building code,". 2 "constructed in a skillful man-
ner," 43 "material defect,"" "owner ' 4  and "warranty date." 4
6
The second discussed the scope of protection new home buyers
would receive under the implied warranty; and the third detailed
how a seller of a new home may exclude or modify any of the
warranties provided therein.4' Further, the Act amended section
213(2) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to exempt the housing
merchant implied warranty from the six year statute of limita-
tions"" and substituted various limitations for the commencement
" See N.Y.S. 5395-A, N.Y.A. 770-B, 211 th Sess. (1988). Co-sponsored by Senator Kehoe
and Assemblyman Serrano, the bill called for the amendment of the General Business Law
with the addition of a new article, Article 36-B: Warranties on Sales of New Homes. Id.
4" See State of New York Legislative Digest, Bill Summary § 318-19 (details legislative
time frame on Warranty on Sales of New Homes Act).
41 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 777, 777-b (McKinney 1989).
42 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777 (2) (McKinney 1989). The phrase "building code" now
signifies:
ItIhe uniform fire prevention and building code council promulgated under section
three hundred seventy-seven of the executive law, local building code standards ap-
proved by the uniform fire prevention and building code council under section three
hundred seventy-nine of the executive law, and the building code of the city of New
York, as defined in title twenty-seven of the administrative code of the city of New
York.
Id.
43 Id. at § 777 (3). The phrase "constructed in a skillful manner" requires that: work-
manship and materials meet or exceed the specific standards of the applicable building
code. When the applicable building code does not provide a relevant specific standard,
such term means that workmanship and materials meet or exceed the standards of locally
accepted building practices. Id.
11 Id. at § 777 (4). A "material defect" includes:
actual physical damage to the following load-bearing portions of the home caused by
failure of such load-bearing portions which affects their load-bearing functions to
the extent that the home becomes unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise unliveable: foun-
dation systems and footings, beams, girders, lintels, columns, walls and partitions,
floor systems, and roof framing systems.
Id.
4' N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW at § 777 (6). The statute defines "owner" to be not only the indi-
vidual to whom the newly built house was sold, but also includes each successive owner
during an unexpired warranty period. Id.
46 Id. at § 777 (8). The "warranty date" is triggered by the earlier of either the transfer
of title to the first owner prior to occupancy, or the date of first occupancy. Id. These
warranty provisions are limited to any single family home, or a transfer of a condominium
or cooperative in a residential structure of five stories or less. Id. at § 777 (5).
11 Id. at § 777-b.




Under the Housing Merchant Implied Warranty Statute, three
different types of warranties survive the passage of title.5" The
first implied warranty provides that the home will be free from
defects due to failure to construct it in a skillful manner for one
year after commencement of the warranty date.5" The second im-
plied warranty provides that the electrical, heating, cooling and
ventilation systems of the home will be free from defects caused
by failing to install these systems in a skillful manner for two years
following the warranty date.5" The final implied warranty pro-
vides that the home will be free from material defects for six
years after the warranty date.5 3
The statutory protections discussed above are limited to some
extent.54 There is no warranty protection for defects not caused
by the builder's defective workmanship, his use of defective
materials, or the use of a defective design where the design pro-
fessional was not exclusively retained by the builder unless other-
wise agreed. 55 Obvious defects which are or should have been dis-
coverable upon inspection prior to acceptance of the home or
transfer of title are also excluded under this statute.56 Addition-
ally, these implied warranty provisions do not include household
appliances sold with the new home except as to faulty
installation. 57
To bring a warranty claim under this statute, the owner must
give the builder written notice that a breach has occurred no later
than thirty days following the expiration of the applicable war-
See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw at § 777-a.
50 Id. at § 777-a (1)(a)-(c); see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. The statutory
safeguards are consistent with Judge Bellacosa's belief that a contract's "standard merger
clause is of no legal effect in th[ose] circumstances of an implied warranty with respect to
latent defects." Caceci v. DiCanio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 56, 526 N.E.2d 266, 266,
530 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (1988) (emphasis added). This statute, together with the court of
appeals decision changes the now antiquated common law doctrine of caveat emptor. Id.
5, Id. at § 777-a (1)(a).
5 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw at § 777-a (1)(b).
I d. at § 777-a (1)(c). See supra note 44 (definition of material defect).
M See id. at § 777-a (2).
55 Id. at § 777-a (2)(a)(i)-(iii).
" Id. at § 777-a (2)(b).
SN.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw at § 777-a (3).
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ranty date.58 The owner must also give the builder a reasonable
opportunity to inspect and cure his breach. 59 If these repairs
prove unsatisfactory, a claim for damages grounded in breach of
the housing merchant implied warranty must be brought within
one year from the relevant warranty period or within four years
from the warranty date, whichever is later.60 Damages consist of
either the cost of repair or replacement, or the "diminution in
value" of the home.6 l
Section 777-b sets forth the procedures for exclusion or modifi-
cation of all express or implied warranties.6 2 A builder who in-
tends to exclude or modify the housing merchant implied war-
ranty must do so in "clear and conspicuous language" and must
strictly comply with the statutory procedure.6 " Of paramount im-
portance is the fact that even if this warranty is excluded, the
8 Id. at § 777-a (4)(a).
59 Id.
60 Id. at § 777-a (4)(b).
61 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw at § 777-a (4)(b). Damages will usually be based upon the reasona-
ble cost of repair or replacement, not to exceed the cost of the home. Id. The court also
has the discretion to give the owner the "diminution in value" produced by the breach of
warranty. Id.
6 See id. at § 777-b. Any warranty besides the housing merchant implied warranty can
be excluded or modified by written agreement which so notifies the owner in "clear and
conspicuous terms." Id. at § 777-b (1)-(2).
63 Id. at § 777-b (4)(a)-(i). For a limited warranty to be valid, it must be in "plain En-
glish"; state clearly at the beginning of the agreement that it is a limited warranty: list by
name and address the parties involved; state whether the warranty will survive to subse-
quent owners; identify the products to be protected; state the standard to be applied to
determine defects; and, enumerate the procedures and time constraints for the owner to
bring a claim and for the builder to act. Id.
The statute emphasized several caveats as to the use of the limited warranty. First, if the
standard used to determine whether a defect has occurred is below local governmental
building code or generally accepted building practices, it shall be void as contrary to public
policy. Id. at § 777-b (4)(e)(i). In its stead, the applicable building code shall become the
warranty standard of the agreement. Id. Second, any agreement allowing delivery of a new
home in other than habitable condition shall be void as contrary to public policy. Id. at §
777-b (4 )(e)(ii). Third, the limited warranty coverage must meet or exceed the coverage
provided under the housing merchant implied warranty. Id. at § 777-b (4)(g). Fourth, a
limited warranty may not exclude or limit property damage proximately caused by breach
of the warranty if the limitation would cause the warranty to fail of its essential purpose.
Id. at § 777-b (4)(i). Fifth, this statute also calls for the preemption of any local laws that
are inconsistent with any of its provisions. Id. at § 777-b (5)(b). Finally, the Act specifies
that the statute shall not be read as "repeal[ing], invalidat[ing], supersedling or re-
strict[ingj any right, liability or remedy provided by any other statute of the state, except
where such construction would, as a matter of law, be unreasonable." Id. at § 777-b (5)(c).
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owner still retains an "express limited warranty '"64 which must
provide the same periods of warranty coverage as the housing
merchant implied warranty,65 and requires the builder to meet or
exceed the applicable building code when constructing a home.6
It does not repeal section 251 of the New York Real Property
Law. Rather, however, its purpose is limited to conveyance of
titles. 7
The Warranties on Sales of New Homes Act received almost
unanimous support upon its introduction. Only the New York
State Office of Business Permits and Regulatory Assistance ex-
pressed disapproval of the new bill.68 It remarked that since the
Caceci decision sufficiently recognized the housing merchant im-
plied warranty, there was no need for additional legislation. 9
The New York State Assembly, expressing approval, noted the
irony that a product costing as little as one dollar was entitled to
complete warranty protection under the Uniform Commercial
Code, while the purchase of a new home costing thousands of dol-
lars was unprotected by any warranty provisions simply because it
was labelled "realty. ' 70 Of equal importance was the New York
State Attorney General's memorandum to the Governor, which
was generally supportive of the bill.71 Although concerned by the
11 Id. at § 777-b (3). The builder is mandated to attach to the contract or agreement a
copy of the express terms of the limited warranty and furnish said appended document to
the owner prior to its execution. Id. at § 777-b (3)(a), (b). The express terms of agreement
shall prominently state that the limited warranty excludes or modifies the housing
merchant implied warranty. Id. at § 777-b(3)(c).
' N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777-b(4)(g).
" Id. at § 777-b (4)(e)(i).
07 Memorandum by New York State Assembly in Support of Bill No.: 770-A, found in
Ch. 709 119881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket).
68 See Memorandum of the New York State Office of Business Permits and Regulatory
Assistance, found in Ch. 709 119881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket). The agency be-
lieved that rather than being a consumer protection device, the statute would allow "build-
ers to limit their liability with respect to the construction of new homes containing latent
material defects." Id.
69 Id.
"0 Compare Memorandum by New York State Assembly in Support of Bill No.: 770-A
(memo on amended bill), found in Ch. 709 [19881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket) (pur-
chasers of new homes receive "less warranty protection than purchasers of other consumer
goods") with U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1977) (protections do not extend to realty) and Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, §§ 103-110, 15 U.S.C.§
2301 (1982) (federally created warranty protections extended to all sales of consumer
goods and is inapplicable to realty transactions).
" See State of New York, Department of Law, Memorandum for the Governor, found in
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bill's failure to provide a mandatory warranty insurance program
which would secure relief for the consumer in the event the
builder became insolvent and to allow for specific private and pub-
lic enforcement remedies, the Attorney General endorsed the bill
as it advanced "significant and important new protections to new
home buyers. '"72
The New York State Consumer Protection Board was also sup-
portive of the bill for two reasons. First, the language of the bill
did not diminish the relief judicially granted by the Caceci deci-
sion.73 Second, consumers would now be protected against boiler-
plate disclaimers made by builders, since the statute requires
"clear and conspicuous" language in order to limit the housing
merchant implied warranty.74
The New York State Builders Association's concern that there
would be as many interpretations of the Caceci decision as there
are regulatory bodies in New York State prompted its support of
this new law." Because 'the home building industry represents a
$2.5 billion per year enterprise in New York, 6 the Association's
support was crucial.
Ch. 709 119881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill jacket). The memorandum sanctioned the "leg-
islative recognition .. .of the existence of an implied 'housing merchant' quality war-
ranty." Id. at 3. Moreover, it suggested similarities between the bill and the warranty provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code regarding limited warranties. Id.
71 Id. at 4.
11 See Memorandum of the New York State Consumer Protection Board, Ch. 709 119881
N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket). The bill does not mandate that damages sought under
the statute be the sole remedy available to the new homeowner. Id. Thus, the statutory
provisions supplement common law right of action and furnished the owner with cumula-
tive remedies. Id. at 2.
71 Id. at 1.
71 See Memorandum Re: Support of S. 5395-A, A. 770-B, New York State Builders' As-
sociation, Inc., Ch. 709 [19881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill jacket). While at first blush such
an endorsement would appear to be highly improbable, it was, in fact, a pragmatic move by
the Association. Id. The Association's backing came on the heels of the Caceci ruling, which
the Association theorized left several open issues. Id. at 2. Concerned with the possibility of
each municipality creating its own individualized warranties, the Association welcomed a
uniform statewide building warranty. Id. at 3-4.
The Association voiced its concern with the failure of the court of appeals to define the
terms "skillful manner" and "material defects." Id. at 2. It was believed that absent legisla-
tive intervention, debates on these terms' meanings would continue ad infinitum in the
courts. Telephone interview with William Crowell, Legal Counsel for the New York State




B. Other States' New Home Warranty Statutes
While a majority of states have judicially recognized some type
of an "implied warranty of habitability or skillful construction"
regarding new home sales," only a handful have provided statu-
tory safeguards." New Jersey provides unique protection under
its New Home Warranty and Builders' Registration Act. 79 Follow-
ing a judgment for the owner, the Act reimburses him for the
necessary repairs to his home.8" The Act requires New Jersey
builders to participate in some type of new home security fund,"
and the integrity of the Fund insures that a successful claimant
will not go without redress.8 2
Additionally, a national program known as the Home Owner's
77 See Caceci v. DiCanio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 58, 526 N.E.2d 266, 268, 530
N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (1988) (twenty-six states renounced use of caveat emptor in sales of
homes substituting implied warranty theory). See also Note, Another Look at the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability in North Carolina, 64 N.C.L. REV. 869, 871 n.30 (1986) (thirty-nine states
and District of Columbia have judicially adopted implied warranty of habitability in sales of
new dwellings): Shedd, supra note 7 at 293 (substantial majority of states have embraced
implied warranties as basis for their decisions).
18 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-116-118 (West 1986) (detail coverage and statutory
time to bring action): MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-201 (1988) (detail coverage and
statutory period): MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327A (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) (detail coverage
which allows recovery for patent defects, and statutory period): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B
(West Supp. 1988) (see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70
(1986 & Supp. 1988) (detail coverage which allows recovery for patent defects, and statu-
tory period): W. VA. CODE § 36B-4-113-116 (Supp. 1988) (same). See also Grand, Implied and
Statutory Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate: The Demise of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EST. L.J.
44 (1986) (national survey of statutes and case law setting forth implied warranties of habit-
ability and good workmanship in new home sales).
70 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B (West Supp. 1988). This Act authorizes the Commissioner of
the Department of Community Affairs to institute regulations prescribing procedures to be
followed in claims brought against builders under the new home warranty security fund.
Id. at § 46:3B-3.
" Id. at § 46:3B-7(c). The Fund was established to insure that owners of new homes
requiring repairs ensuing from defects would be able to obtain remedial, compensatory
relief in the event the builder "willfully refused" or was unable to make the necessary
repairs. Id. at § 46:3B-7(a). The owner's decision to have an administrative hearing for
recovery of damages constitutes an "election barring all other remedies." Id. at § 46:3B-9
(emphasis added).
8 Id. at §§ 46:3B-5, 3B-8. Participation in the Fund is mandatory and it is monitored
under the auspices of the New Jersey State Treasurer. Id. at § 46:3B-7(a). The Act requires
builders of dwellings within New Jersey to be registered with the Department of Commu-
nity Affairs, and able to show proof of participation in the new home warranty security
fund or some other approved program. Id. at § 46:3B-5. Once the owner alleges a breach
of warranty and the parties have been unable to effectuate a remedy, the commissioner can
step in. Id. at § 46:3B-6.
" Id. at § 46:3B-7(c).
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Warranty (HOW) program may furnish purchasers of newly built
homes some type of relief.83 The HOW program is a voluntary
organization, established by the National Association of Home
Builders.84 Similar to the New Jersey Act, it allows builders to
purchase a ten year "insurance policy" against defects.85
It is interesting to note the resemblance among the New York
and New Jersey warranty statutes and the HOW program. The
language of both states' statutes appears to have been patterned
after the language in the HOW program. However, there is one
significant aspect of the HOW program and the New Jersey stat-
ute that is noticeably absent from the New York statute. Whereas
HOW and the New Jersey statute have granted home owners new
home warranty protection in the form of an insurance program,
New York offers no such provision.86
C. Critical Comparisons
While the Warranties on Sales of New Homes Act sought to
address many of the issues raised by the "Housing Merchant"
warranty enunciated in Caceci, it is suggested that the Act contains
ambiguities likely to result in extensive litigation unless legislative
amendment is effected.
Although the Act has supplied definitions for such terms as
"constructed in a skillful manner" and "material defect", it is sub-
mitted that the statutory language is open to varying interpreta-
tions. For example, the statute has defined the phrase "con-
structed in a skillful manner" as that which complies with the
applicable building code.8 However, as noted by the New York
State Builders Association, such codes do not necessarily provide a
"relevant specific standard for construction .. .and may provide
11 See Shedd, supra note 7, at 301-02 (description of ten year insurance plan bought for
purchasers of new homes by builders against defects): K HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 6,
§ 40.02121 at 40-11 (same).
8 K. HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 6, § 40.02111 at 40-10.
Id. The policy calls for the builder to remedy defects for the first and second years,
with the policy paying for any repairs during the next eight years. Id.
86 See State of New York, Department of Law, Memorandum for the Governor at 4,
found in Ch. 709 119881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket) (criticism by Attorney General
of New York's failure to incorporate insurance program similar to that of New Jersey).
87 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW at § 777 (3).
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only a general or non-specific statement" to follow generally ac-
cepted trade practices."8  The "material defect" definition,
adopted from the HOW program's policy interpretation of a "ma-
jor structural defect," 9 raises the issue of what is "unsafe" or
"unliveable" within the meaning of the statute. 90 It is suggested
that reasonable experts could differ as to whether a given defect
renders a home unsafe, or uninhabitable, as well as which gener-
ally accepted trade practice is superior. Until these and similar
ambiguities are eliminated, abuses by both vendors and purchas-
ers are likely to result. It is proposed that purchasers, unsure of
what a material defect is, may repeatedly ask the builder to make
minor and non-material repairs to make the home "liveable," in
the mistaken belief that the builder is so required by the Act.9
Alternatively, the purchaser may not be cognizant of which gener-
ally accepted building practice is appropriate in a given construc-
tion situation and may unwittingly rely on the vendor's opinion.
In addition, the Act makes the presumption that the buyer is so-
phisticated and knowledgeable as to his rights therein. As a result,
the buyer may unknowingly accept less than the statute provides.
Furthermore, the final version of the Act suggests that com-
promises were made, possibly to the New York State Builders As-
sociation, in return for their support of this bill. Of particular sig-
nificance was the legislative decision to decrease the warranty
period for material defects from ten to six years," and its removal
s Memorandum Re: Support of S. 5395-A, A. 770-B, New York State Builders Associa-
tion, Inc., found in Ch. 709 119881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket) at 4.
9 See K. HOLTZSCHJE, supra note 6, § 40.02[2] at 40-12. The HOW program has inter-
preted a "major structural defect" as the "actual physical damage to the following desig-
nated load-bearing portions which affects their load-bearing functions to the extent that
the home becomes unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise unliveable: 1. Foundation systems and
footings: 2. Beams- 3. Girders- 4. Lintels; 5. Columns; 6. Walls and partitions; 7. Floor
systems: and 8. Roof framing systems." Id.
" N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw at § 777 (4). Neither the Act nor the the HOW program define
the severity of actual physical damage necessary to cause a home to become "unsafe, un-
sanitary or otherwise unliveable." See id.; K. HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 6, § 40.0212], at 40-12
(HOW program failed to stipulate how much actual physical damage is needed before it
becomes "major structural defect", thereby making home. "unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise
unliveable.").
8' See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw at § 777 (4) (defining "material defect").
92 Memorandum by New York Assembly in Support of Bill No.: 770-A (memo on
amended bill), found in Ch. 709 11988] N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket), dated Sept. 1,
1988. Between September 1, 1988 and September 6, 1988 when the statute was enacted,
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of an insurance warranty program.9" Therefore, a new home
owner receiving a favorable judgment may ultimately be the loser
due to an inability to recover damages from an insolvent builder.
Finally, it is submitted that courts may come to view the protec-
tion afforded owners under Caceci as obsolete, in light of the pro-
tection found within the Act. The Caceci court based recovery on
the "reasonable expectations" of homeowners, rather than on a
set time period in which to bring a claim.94 A lower court has
recently suggested, however, that the Act's remedies would not
coexist with the common law approach, and would instead be-
come the exclusive relief available to purchasers.95 Yet, the statute
does not suggest that it is the exclusive remedy and in fact its leg-
islative history suggest the contrary.96 It is submitted that subse-
the Assembly reduced the coverage period for protection against structural defects.
11 Compare Memorandum by New York State Assembly in Support of Bill No. 770-A
(memo on original draft of bill), found in Ch. 709 11988] N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill
Jacket) (inclusion of insurance fund for owners of new homes) with Memorandum by New
York State Assembly in Support of Bill No. 770-A (memo on amended bill), found in Ch.
709 119881 N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket) (no mention of insurance fund for new
home purchasers). Mr. Crowell, counsel for New York State Builders Association viewed
the elimination of insurance provision as representing no real harm to homeowner. Tele-
phone interview with William Crowell, Legal Counsel for the New York State Builders'
Association (Oct. 25, 1988). He indicated it was unnecessary to impose a state insurance
program because of availability of insurance coverage under HOW program. Id. Although
the HOW program is a legitimate and viable alternative for insurance coverage, enroll-
ment is voluntary, and unless the purchaser requests the builder to obtain insurance under
this program, none will be supplied. See When Dream Homes Turn Into Nightmares, U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REP., at 43, 44-45 (Dec. 11, 1978) (describing the effectiveness of the HOW
program in procuring relief for the homeowner without undue hardship): Seib, Raising the
Roof: Buyers of New Homes Find Shoddiness, Flaws are Growing Problems, Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 28, 1979, at 1, 25, col. 6, 1 (same). But see New Jersey's New Home Warranty and
Builders' Registration Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3 (West 1988). The New Jersey Act
differs from the New York Warranties on Sales of New Homes Act in that it establishes a
fund to secure owner's claims for defects and provides ten years of protection against dam-
age resulting from "major construction defects" compared to the six year provision under
the New York Act. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. at § 46:3B-3(b)(3) with N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW at §
777-a (1)(c).
" Caceci v. DiCanio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 60-61, 526 N.E.2d 266, 270, 530
N.Y.S.2d 771, 775 (1988).
" See Vento v. Honeybee Homes Inc., 141 Misc. 2d 997, 998-99, 535 N.Y.S.2d 344, 345
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1988) (inference drawn by court that litigation arising
from new home sale contracts entered into after March 1, 1989 would be subject to statute
of limitations periods as set forth in the Act).
" See Memorandum of the New York State Consumer Protection Board, Ch. 709 119881
N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket) at 2. The Board noted that the legislature did not de-
clare the housing merchant implied warranty to be the sole relief available to a claimant.
Id. Since it appears that the legislature's intent was not to deprive a party of the common
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quent courts guard against similarly restricting a purchaser's
rights against a builder contrary to the spirit of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The ability of an individual to secure the quality of workman-
ship bargained for in the purchase of a new home was, until re-
cently, subject to judicial interpretation of the express contract
between the vendor and purchaser. Presently, New York citizens
have implicit in every sales contract for a new home certain war-
ranties as to the habitability and skill of the work performed, as a
matter of law. Yet the euphoric picture painted by the sponsors
and supporters of this new law is not without its flaws. At the very
least, however, a homeowner has been placed in an equal bargain-
ing position with a vendor. Moreover, he is now better able to
hold a builder to his word.
Nancy B. Burlingame
law protection prescribed in Caceci, the general rule then is to treat the statutory relief as
supplementing and not excluding the common law remedy. Id.
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